Recognizably different Islamic trends in contemporary Northern Nigeria can be described in terms of traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism, and each trend can be correlated to a different educational background as well as a different political orientation. Within the last two decades, each of these trends has changed, with traditionalism shifting toward modernism; and modernism becoming fundamentalism, while fundamentalism faces imminent transformation in uncertain directions. Although handy for analyzing different trends, traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism should be recognized as discursive categories that are capable of not only revealing but also erasing subtleties, linkages and nuances of constantly changing social movements.
Introduction
The political implications of Islamic sectarianism have dominated the recent literature on Islam on contemporary Nigeria (Anwar 1992; Umar 1993; Kane 1994; Loimeier 1997). The long-term consequences of Islamic reforms of the 1970s and 1980s have not yet been studied. This essay explores some of these long-term consequences by analyzing Islamic trends of traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism, and correlating each with different educational background. It argues that since observable changes over the last three decades indicate that these trends are not mutually exclusive, the terms traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism must be interrogated and reevaluated.
Islamic Traditionalism
Nigerian `ulama' (Islamic religious scholars) represent an Islamic trend that can be termed "Islamic traditionalism" without necessarily implying a changeless essentialism. The traditionalism of the Nigerian `ulama' articulates a conception of Islam identical with the "great tradition" of Islam: officiating in Islamic public rituals, instructing Muslims in Islamic precepts, and interpreting and administering Islamic law. Thus consistent with the norm in Islamic societies globally (Cohen 1970; Gilbert 1980), Nigerian `ulama' preoccupy themselves with the broad ideological parameters of Islamic societies especially in the religious, educational, and legal domains.
As in other Islamic societies, Nigerian `ulama' have also been part of the ruling elite, serving as judges, ministers, scribes, and counselors to rulers. The historical integration of the `ulama' into the ruling elite--perhaps best exemplified in the `ilmiye of the Ottoman Empire (Shaw 1976; Ugur 1986)--has historically been characterized by a tension dividing the `ulama' into two opposing political orientations. While some `ulama' belong to the ruling elite, labeled polemically `ulama' al-su' (venal scholars), other `ulama' preferred to keep distance from the political arena, claiming the self-righteous name of `ulama' al-sunna (righteous scholars) (Madelung 1980; Marlow 1995). In his analysis of the orientations of `ulama' toward politics, Bernard Lewis (1986) identifies one orientation as "quietist" because it views tyranny as a lesser evil than anarchy, and stresses obedience even to a tyrannical ruler in order to preserve Islamic public order. Lewis describes the other orientation as "activist" because it emphasizes that absolute obedience is due to God alone, and if a ruler becomes sinful he should not be obeyed. An appreciation of how these opposing orientations evolved in Northern Nigeria, and the broader West African context, is important for understanding the contemporary Islamic traditionalism of Nigerian `ulama'.
Historians of Islam in West Africa identify "Suwarian tradition" with quietism and "Maghilian tradition" with activism (Hiskett 1969; Wilks 1968; Batran 1973; Sanneh 1976; Levtzion 1978; Hunwick 1986). The jihad movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought activist `ulama' into power as rulers rather than merely ministers and advisers. This development reversed the equation between "righteous scholars" and "venal scholars." Thus before the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate between 1804 and 1810--the Islamic polity that ruled Northern Nigeria until replaced by the British colonialists in 1903--the "righteous scholars" were those who kept distance from the rulers of the Hausa states, while the "venal scholars" were those who worked for these rulers. This distinction was reversed after "the righteous scholars" became the rulers of the Sokoto Caliphate, yet `ulama' continue to exhibit both "quietism" and "activism" (Hiskett 1973; Jalingo 1982-1985) even after colonialism transforms Islamic traditionalism in a manner comparable to the changing roles of `ulama' globally (Keddie 1972). But first, what is the educational background of Nigerian `ulama''s? Nigerian `ulama' are trained in the traditional Islamic educational system, which comprises two tracks that originated from the precolonial period (Fafunwa 1991). The first tract is makarantar allo (Qur'anic school) that forms primary level in traditional Islamic education, focusing on Arabic literacy and memorizing the Qur'an. Those able to successfully memorize the entire Qur'an become professional reciters, Qur'anic teachers, scribes, and copyists. Lubeck (1985) observes that graduates of makarantar allo were members of the Maitatsine "sect" that led a series of religious uprisings in the 1980s, thus highlighting the connection between particular Islamic trends with specific educational backgrounds. Not all graduates of makarantar allo join the Maitatsine sect or become professional Qur'an reciters. Most Muslims will memorize only enough Qur'an for their own devotional use. A choice of a different Islamic scholarship takes one to makarantar ilimi (knowledge school).
Whereas makarantar allo begins from early childhood and usually terminates by adolescence, the makarantar ilimi does not start before adolescence and often lasts for the entire life of most students, but some may abandon the intellectual pursuits or at some stage become learned enough to be recognized as teachers. The curriculum in makarantar ilmi includes Arabic Language and Literature, Islamic Law, Theology and Logic, Qur'anic Exegesis, Traditions of Muhammad, Islamic History and Local Histories (Oseni 1999). Graduates of makarantar ilimi and those of Qur'anic schools constitute the mallam class, the Hausa word for `ulama' (Abubakar 1972; Hiskett 1976; Tahir 1978; Galadanci 1982; Fafunwa 1991).
Nigerian `ulama' have historically enjoyed considerable influence and social prestige. They traveled widely in search of specialized teachers and clientele, and formed a notable part of trading stations all over West Africa (zangos), serving as teachers, letter-writers, legal-draftsmen and notary public, record-keepers, and of course as religious specialists (Adamu 1978). Similarly, only `ulama' could hold certain governmental positions in the precolonial era, including wazir (prime minister and legal adviser to the Emir), alkali (Hausa for qadi, judge) of the shari`ah courts, and imam (leader of Islamic congregational devotion). But consistent with the norm in Islamic societies, some `ulama' avoided governmental positions and preferred to teach private circles of disciples, especially during the colonial period 1903-1960.
The British introduced western education during the 1910s and 1920s, a development that undermined `ulama''s monopoly over literacy and access to positions, resources, and prestige. Early in the colonial period, British authorities found that `ulama' could play crucial roles in establishing colonial administrative infrastructures especially in judicial and educational domains, and recruited the `ulama' as local historians, translators, and "native anthropologists" who provided data for compiling district gazetteers used to acquaint new colonial administrators with the history and cultural traditions of the communities they were to administer (Kirk-Greene 1972). Yet even as the colonial administration employed the `ulama', colonialism introduced alternatives to their skills through western education. When the first generation of western-educated Muslims inherited power at independence in 1960, the influence of `ulama' began to change.
Changes in the Traditionalism of Nigerian `Ulama'
One notable change in the traditional roles of Nigerian `ulama' originating from the colonial period is the transformation of Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders. John Paden's pioneer study (1973) documents significant changes in the revival of these Sufi orders that peaked between the 1940s and 1960s and declined significantly thereafter. The late 1970s saw both Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya staging comebacks in reaction to Islamic modernism (Umar 1993, 1995). A key feature of this comeback is the successful transformation of Sufi orders to function effectively as civil associations that aggregate, articulate, and promote both the religious and material interests of their leaders and members (Loimeier 1997). Their continuing operation across borders of modern nation-states has kept the linkage of Nigerian `ulama' to global currents of Islamic traditionalism (Kane 1997). It is, however, important to note that Sufi orders do not seek to limit arbitrary exercise of state power--a prominent feature of the liberal conception of civil society. In fact, Nigerian `ulama' are not averse to influencing state coercive agencies against rival Islamic trends or seeking rents from state economic enterprises. While it is debatable whether or not the Sufi orders are becoming a part of a civil society, it seems clear that their changing roles and orientations represent a notable change in the traditionalism of Nigerian `ulama'.
A dramatic change within Islamic traditionalism is the series of Maitatsine uprisings that first erupted in December 1980, resulting in the colossal destruction of thousands of human lives (4,177 dead according to official figures) and property of yet undetermined value. Similar major Maitatsine uprisings recurred at Bulunkutu-Maiduguri and Rigassa-Kaduna in October 1982,, Yola-Jemeta in February 1984, and Gombe in 1985. Muslims do not want to identify Maitatsine as one of the `ulama'. It cannot, however, be disputed that Maitatsine and his followers emerged from Qur'anic schools that form the primary level of traditional Islamic education in Nigeria.
Scholars account for Maitatsine uprisings in term of adverse economic conditions that have continued to deteriorate since the 1970s, when rampant graft had already began to destroy the Nigerian economy (Christelow 1985; Hiskett 1987; Isichei 1987). Paul Lubeck argues that "It is impossible to understand urban social life, the gardawa [i.e., graduates of Qur'anic schools] or most importantly, the Yan Tatsine in Kano without taking into account the articulation of capitalist and precapitalist institutions" (Lubeck 1985: 369-89). More recently, Michael Watts (1996) explains Maitatsine uprisings in terms of an Islamic civil society rejecting capitalist development while coping with issues of modernization. Although Maitatsine uprisings severely tested the security apparatus of the Nigerian State, it is imperative to realize that the Maitatsine "movement" hardly represents a civic association seeking to limit hegemony of the
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